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# The Role of Political Behavior and Socio-Economic Development in the Transition and Consolidation of Liberal Democracy in Sub Saharan Africa

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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF LIBERAL  
DEMOCRACY IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA

A Thesis

Presented to The

McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of

The requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Social and Public Policy

By

Godfrey Wachira

11-17-2004.



**THESIS SIGNATURE PAGE**

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The Role of Political Behavior and Socio Economic Development on the Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

Master of Arts

Thesis

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**ABSTRACT**

The study utilizes the multivariate regression techniques to investigate the role of political behavior; power structure (at the micro level) and socio economic development (macro level) in the transition and consolidation of **democracy in Sub Saharan Africa**.

In the analysis, political behavior, defined as the acceptance of political elites to accommodate divergent views, is the most significant predictor of democracy in the region. Socio economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the consolidation of democracy in the region. In conclusion, I argue that Sub Saharan African nations must pursue both political and economic liberalization which entails the creation of a business elite that is separate from the political elites in order to consolidate the democratic gains achieved in the past decade.

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I dedicate this project to my family and especially to my mother. Your love, support and encouragement has motivated me all my life. I thank God for the blessing of having the best mother I would ever possibly imagine. To my brothers Ngatia and Wang'ombe, sisters Anne, Elizabeth and Jayne, my nephews Wachira and Ruga, and niece Wairimu, thank you very much for all you have done for me. To Elizabeth, thank you for your love and support away from home.

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*“The next challenge for the analysis of democratic transitions is to create an organic structure that combines the modernization and political agent theses. One research strategy to tackle this challenge is to formalize the behavior of the actors and the change of the politico-economic structures as jointly evolving”* (Kugler and Feng, 144).

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW**

At the national level, the adoption of democratic rule provides the population with the ability to replace their government without bloodshed. It empowers the people to effect critical choices and provides them with access to the political decision-making process and economic prosperity. The complex relationship between the forms of government, economic development and underlying political and cultural values has been the subject of scholarly research for a long time. In recent years this relationship has attracted the attention of policymakers as there is a growing awareness that problems of governance, public policy and economic performance are interconnected. As a result of this, multilateral institutions, western aid providers, and governments in many countries have placed the promotion of good governance on their policy agenda (Pei 2003:1).

Because of Sub-Sahara Africa’s poverty, observers who perceive economic progress as logically and chronologically superordinate to political pluralism see the process of restoring political legitimacy as anomalous. In Sub-Sahara Africa, “predatory authoritarianism has been a central cause of the region’s economic underdevelopment- not its handmaiden like in a few Asian countries. Correspondingly, political pluralism is necessary but not sufficient for African economic recovery and not a luxury to be postponed until middle-income Nirvana is achieved” (McFerson 1992:241).

During the 1990s, a number of scholars began challenging the ‘no preconditions’ line, with analyses of the roles that economic wealth, institutional legacies, social class, and other structural factors play in attempted democratic transitions (Carothers 2002:16). The concern of this study is



to investigate the relationship between economic development, structure of power distribution and political actors' behavior on one hand and democracy on the other hand in a "transition period". The central question we address is how does economic development, the structure of power and political actors' behavior jointly affect, and be affected by, the prospects of a democratic transition and consolidation. We apply the insights from our findings to the Sub Saharan Africa development experience in the 1990s. I seek to investigate whether *there is a relationship between economic development, power distribution and political actors' behavior on one hand and transitional democracy*. In this study I hold the position that Sub-Saharan Africa is still in transition to democracy. Transitional democracy in this study is considered as a continuous process that culminates in the consolidation of democratic practices in the particular countries.

The analysis assesses the claims of both modernization theory and political agent thesis using contemporary empirical evidence from Sub-Sahara Africa. To arrive at the conclusions it considers the claims of both theories by regressing their indicators in a series of statistical applications. Second, it operationalizes various variables and democracy using various indicators in an effort to test the generalizations about the relationship that are drawn from global comparisons. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa and for the theories in general. The statistical analysis indicates that political behavior is the most significant predictor of the level of democracy in a nation. Economic development and the structure of power, on the other hand are necessary but not sufficient factors affecting the level of democracy in the countries studied.

## **1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Authoritarian leaders and single party regimes of all shades came under great pressures between 1990 and 1993 to liberalize and permit more participation in the political process. This transformation, what Samuel Huntington described as the 'third wave' of democratization, stemmed from sustained efforts by domestic political forces, albeit assisted by a variety of

demanding requirements from international financial institutions and industrialized countries, as well as by the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Makinda 1996:556 ).

During the 1980's, an active array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non governmental organizations devoted to promoting democracy abroad sprang into being. The pressures for reform were coupled with references to four principal issues: human rights, responsible and accountable governments, an end to corruption, and strong public institutions. This drive for political liberalization came in the wake of similar efforts by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote structural change. Thus Sub-Sahara Africa has faced dual fundamental political and economic reforms in the 1990s. Political and economic reforms have symbolized efforts by African regimes to do something to improve their own conditions, and the West has occasionally withheld assistance to states in which these measures have not been implemented as agreed.

Although democracy is becoming the prevalent form of government, we seek to understand the underlying domestic dynamics that cause the transformation from authoritarian to democratic systems of government. Today most sub-Saharan African countries are considered to be somewhere in between outright dictatorship and well established liberal democracy. "Multi-party systems have emerged all over the continent. Much less clear, however, is the extent to which these countries are progressing towards democratic consolidation, by which democratic norms are institutionalized and routinized by the political system" (Van der Walle 2000:6). Why do countries decide to head toward democracy? Why do democracies fail to consolidate themselves? Will today's transformations be reversed or obliterated? What is the status of democracy in sub-Sahara Africa today?

A decade after the initiation of these reforms, we seek to understand the performance of African regimes in the process of democratization and what factors may lead to consolidation of democratic practices. Much of the optimism of the early 1990s has faded (Carothers 2002:4; Van

de Walle 2000:7; Makinda 1996:572), are there prospects for the consolidation of democratic practices?

### 1.3 RATIONALE

My interest in this study is motivated by my personal experiences and expectations. In 1990 the clamor for political changes began in Kenya. Riots in the country especially in the capital city, Nairobi were numerous and often very violent. This helped me gain awareness about the political problems in the country and I developed an activist stance. In 1992, I joined University of Nairobi to pursue a degree in Social Sciences. University students were at the forefront of this activism, aided by the lumpen proletariat, I actively participated in what was termed the 'second liberation'. Later in 1992, the government of Daniel Arap Moi succumbed to local and international pressure and legalized multipartyism. Subsequent years have seen a drive for consolidation of the democratic reforms. This culminated with the start of the process of comprehensive constitutional reforms in 2000. Today there is a different government that took over power in 2003. Our expectations on the political reforms that the government would initiate have not been met; leading to question what is needed for democracy to consolidate in sub-Saharan Africa.

I also take up the challenge of Jacek Kulger and Yi Feng (*Explaining and Modeling Democratic Transitions, 1999*) to create a model that seeks to investigate the dynamics of the transition period to democracy and its prospects for consolidation of democracy. This is especially important since today there are growing fears among scholars that the political reforms in Sub Saharan Africa during the early 1990s may begin to be taken away and some nations may slide back to authoritarian regimes. According to various scholars, African countries lie between outright dictatorship and established liberal democracy. The challenge is to keep the democratization process moving in the right direction and fast enough to become irreversible before the populace become disillusioned. We cannot predict how much time is necessary or available for a successful transition but we can certainly seek to establish the conditions necessary for a successful transition.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Historical studies suggest that modern democracies can occur only under certain conditions of capital industrialization. Karl Marx identified the bourgeoisie as the major force behind the emergence of democracy. He argued that the capitalist class used parliamentary systems and democratic mechanisms to capture the control of the state from the traditional elite. Max Weber marked the importance of Protestantism in the development of western democracies. He considered individualism and a sense of individual responsibility, inherent in the Protestant ethic, as the major conditions for the development of burgher classes and a democratic political culture. He argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another country

Arat (1988:21) argues that “the sociology of knowledge, which emphasizes the influence of structure and organizational setting on the development of attitudes and behaviors, compels us to direct our attention to the structural basis of developing such a culture or personality. In this regard, aspects of modernization appear to be the common explanatory factors used in the analysis of democracy.” Some scholars (Arat, Landman) argue that the variables of modernization do not sufficiently explain the emergence of democracy in the Third World.

According to Van de Walle, the spread of the “third wave” of democratization to Africa in the early 1990s represented the most significant political change in the continent since the independence period three decades before. Throughout the continent, significant political liberalization resulted in the emergence of a free press, opposition parties, independent unions and a multitude of civic organizations autonomous from the state. In 29 out of 47 states in the region, the first multi-party elections were held between 1990 and 1994. When the wave of democratization began some academicians were pessimistic about its prospects because of the common assumption that democratization would increase societal pressures on governmental decision making. “New democratic governments face exceptionally strong distributive pressures, both from groups reentering the political arena after long periods of repression and from after

long periods of repression and from established interests demanding reassurance” (Van de Wall 2000:3) This suggests that the democratization process represented a sharp historical discontinuity in the mode of governance.

Leslie Armijo (2001) argues that there are three observations about transitions to democracy. First, it is harder for a country to become democratic than to maintain preexisting democracy. Adam Przeworski (Armijo 2001:21) notes that the rational calculations made by all political actors must suggest to them that the payoffs expected from playing the democratic game, over the medium run, will be greater than those anticipated from subverting democracy. Second, heightened economic insecurity usually is not auspicious for a successful democratic transition. Thirdly, the process of democratization may be conceived of as typically including three stages: political liberalization (loosening of overt authoritarian controls); formal transition to democracy (when country adopts new laws and procedures marking an official, legal transition to democratic rules of the game); and democratic consolidation (internalization and normative acceptance of the new democratic procedures by all the major political actors.)

The political scene in Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by authoritarian regimes and structured around the ‘patron-client’ structure. Van de Walle (2000:4) uses the term neopatrimonialism to indicate that most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practices co-exist with modern bureaucracy.” Outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order. However, this official order is often subverted by a patrimonial logic, in which office holders’ almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses and political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including patronage, various forms of rent seeking and prebendalism. These regimes are highly presidential, in the sense that power is centralized around a single individual, with ultimate control over most clientelist networks. The president personally exerts discretionary power over a big share of the state’s resources. The public office is treated as a personal grant from the leader and the beneficiary is expected to

exploit the 'rent' potential of the office and reciprocates by giving the ruler absolute loyalty and share of the 'rent'. He, in turn, subcontracts the granting of subordinate prebends with overall enforcement provided by the army (McFerson 1992:243).

According to Kandeh (1999: 349) the role of politicians or the political class in creating the conditions that allow subalterns to usurp power and terrorize society cannot be overstated. As a primary instrument of class formation, the state in Africa lacks relative autonomy and is highly amenable to the interests of political incumbents. "Formative ruling class functionality describes the capacity of states to create conditions and pursue policies that privilege the accumulation of wealth by ruling elites" (Kandeh 1999: 351). Jean-Paul Azam (2002) argues that a credible redistribution system that prevents the risk of civil war by ethnic groups by determining the share of state bounty that each group demands lies at the heart of the organization of the African organization. "The 'triangular predation game', whereby the village predates on its own migrants, who in turn prey the state, and push it to extract as much as possible from the villagers creates the links that hold the African society together" (Azam 2002: 1).

"Reproductive ruling class functionality" refers to the capacity of states to successfully define, embody and project the interests of the ruling class as universal and legitimate. According to Azam (2002:5), the different ethno-regional groups send 'delegates' to the capital city where, beside the high and regular incomes, the 'delegates' do ensure the political participation of their group. Thus the political regimes are steeped in corruption, opportunism, cronyism and sycophancy. Therefore the challenge of the transition to constitutional democracy must herald a break from the institutional and elite practices of the past.


Control of, and access to public offices and resources determine the social location of the elites. The 'delegates' who fall out of favor seek to gain access to the state resources by either waging a civil war or leading the opposition parties in the country. (Carothers 2002:16) But while state power is materially transformative for ruling elites, the corruption and repression that attend its exercise often preclude the construction of legitimate political institutions. Political elites

cause the dysfunctional states in sub-Saharan Africa and therefore a change in their predatory behavior indicates a ‘real’ transition to democracy. Policy failures do not represent a major threat to the political survival of the leadership because the institutional setup of these systems provides ample private benefits to essential backers (de Mesquita *et al* 1999:160). Unless the question of politicians exploiting primordial ties is addressed, the future of multi-partyism in Africa will remain uncertain (Makinda 1996:570). According to Mbaku (2003:18), this state of affairs was caused by two developments: statism and single party rule. First, at independence the development model emphasized government control of resource allocation, minimized the functions of the market, and granted significant power to intervene in private exchange, as well as to own and control productive resources (statism). Secondly, one party rule was chosen as the means to effectively manage ethnic diversity through a strong central government that represented ‘all streams of opinions and societal groups.’


The rent seeking motivations do not disappear with democratization; one set of crony businessmen is simply replaced by another set. The changes did have an impact on the process of elite accommodation. Previously the leaders built broad elite coalitions to include all ethnic groups. With regular elections, the leaders build a multi-ethnic coalition that can guarantee them victory without having to include all ethnic groups in the country (Makinda 1996:570; Van de Walle 2000:14 Carothers 2002:12) De Mesquita *et al* (1999:152) argue that “the larger the winning coalition in a country, the thinner must be spread the private goods that are available with which to purchase political loyalty”. The diagram below illustrates the underlying workings of the patron client system. The second diagram is modeled on a dining table. The President serves at the head of the table and the ‘meal’ is the state resources. Those invited to the table gain access to the resources including state contracts, influential jobs, and protection to misappropriate the resources. The closer one sits to the president, the more power one has in the country. The presidents, at whose discretion it is, to make invitations on occasions drop some members from the dining elites (‘dumped elites’). With limited access to the state resources, these dumped elites

are highly affected economically by the consequences of this action. They then invite others on the 'waiting list' usually the subordinate elites to replace the 'dumped' elites. The presidents usually hold on to power by ensuring that the elites continuously pledge loyalty to ensure their continued presence on the 'table'. The 'dumped' elites are the prime movers of the opposition parties in the region. They are joined by the undecided opportunists to seek to change the regime and therefore partake of the 'national cake'. Therefore regime changes do not signal a change in the rent seeking motivations but a mere replacement of one set of cronies with another.

### Illustrations of the Patron Client structure







According to Armijo (2001:22), the problem with third world regimes is that they get 'stuck' between the formal transition to democracy and the democratic consolidation stages. Thus the democratization is considered illiberal. Some observers have described the situation in Africa as the 'fallacy of electoralism' the notion that these countries hold regular elections which constitute meaningful political exercises in giving citizens meaningful choices over the distribution of power and resources.

According to Carothers (2002: 5-9) the transition paradigm has five core assumptions: any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition to democracy, democracy tends to unfold in a sequence of stages, the determinative importance of elections, the underlying structural features of a nation will not be major forces either in the onset or outcome of the transition process, and that the transition is based on coherent, functioning states.

Carothers argues that many of the countries in the third wave have fallen in between outright dictatorship and well established democracy. He categorizes these nations into two categories: feckless pluralism and dominant power politics where he states that most sub-Sahara African countries fall. He argues that nations in these categories are not in transition to democracy but in alternate directions, not way stations to liberal democracy. Thus they are in a state of normality. In his analysis, we should discard the notion of transitional democracy and focus on the democratic conditions that the countries are faced with today.

A theory used to explain transitional democracy is the “Political Agent thesis” which focuses on the actions of the political actors. Van de Walle argues that African political systems have been characterized by relatively low levels of political participation. He argues that the democratization did not create new social coalition because professional associations and interest groups are relatively weak. One of the biggest obstacles to liberal democracy in Africa is the suspicion and fear with which the leaders view democracy (Makinda 1996:556).

According to Feng and Zak (1999:163), as countries develop, the distribution of wealth (or income) typically widens and some benefit from the changes. They argue that political rights and civil liberties are goods in agents’ consumption sets. The agents thus seek political freedom by engaging in political activity which is the “foundation for the development of a civil society” (Feng and Zak 1999:164). The political activity is driven by economic or political concerns. Thus the role of political agents is paramount in the transition and consolidation of democratic practices.

Makinda (1996:557) argues that the dominant cultural values of any society, together with its ethnic composition, level of education, and economic system, are important determinants of its political ideas and institutions. African countries have relatively weak class or interest groups; representation is often based on ethnic or religious affiliation. In such societies, political divisions tend to be vertical, since members of an ethnic group often band together irrespective of their social status. “In the absence of effective lower class demands for political participation, political

reforms may cease with partial liberalization of overt authoritarian controls on middle class civil liberties, stopping well short of full democratization (Armijo 2001:38)

According to Makinda (1996:557) historical factors (colonialism), economic growth, technological infrastructure, and the cultural dimension of poverty, underdevelopment, injustice and authoritarianism are factors that affect liberal democracy in Africa. He further argues that “most African societies do not have a tradition of liberal democracy, and those leaders who took power after independence destroyed whatever checks and balances their constitutions contained” (Makinda 1996:557). The position that historical precedence to democracy affects the chances of democratic transition and consolidation is also upheld by Armijo (2001:23), Gleditsch (35), and many other scholars. Makinda asserts that democracy cannot take root in Africa because people are unfamiliar with the structures through which they can express their decisions. He states, “It is difficult to see how a society can exact accountability from its political leaders and civil servants if its population cannot clearly differentiate public from private issues, and is not well informed” (Makinda 1996: 558). Bratton and Mattes (2001:120) argue that many Africans interpret democracy in universal terms, and value it intrinsically as well as instrumentally; their understanding of democratic principles is extremely vague.

Zielinski (1999) argues that the military plays a critical role in the transition process. He argues that transition to and consolidation of democracy is a bargaining situation between the reformers in the government and the moderates in the opposition over the extent of political change, with the reformers attempting to preserve as much power as possible and the moderates trying to get as close to democracy as they can. Violence occurs in this period according to Zielinski when the reformers are misinformed about the military position on the changes. He argues that where the military’s stated goals are clearly disseminated there are less chances of violence and also that the support by the military for democratic changes is crucial in attaining the changes.

Widner argues that courts play a big role in the consolidation of democracy particularly in a post conflict society. She states “ in post conflict transitions, courts can enhance the levels of public contestation and inclusiveness of participation in political processes, as well as help to implement democracy as a set of everyday practices” (Widner 2001:72). She argues that courts in Africa have leveled the playing field among contenders for public power by upholding rules that support free and fair elections. However this influence is not always straightforward. She argues that courts and law are likely to become more effective in Africa after a ‘critical juncture’, a confluence of events that causes the executive to delegate more authority to the courts and changes people’s willingness to take cases to judges for resolution.

The role of interdependence and interaction across orders in world politics is also emphasized as a contributing factor towards the transition and consolidation of democracy. Kristian Gleditsch asserts that international aspects such as the [political structures in proximate states and regional threats that states face strongly influence the likelihood that a country will be democratic and experience transitions. She states that “the distribution of authority characteristics is not independent between countries, but displays strong evidence of patterns of diffusion” (Gleditsch, 35). Therefore the distribution of democracy is not independent among countries, rather international factors and processes, especially at the regional level influence the likelihood that a country will become or remain democratic.

A closely related factor that leads to democratic transition and consolidation is the external pressure (Makinda 1996:562; Van de Walle 2000:4; McPherson 1992:244; Carothers 2002:6). Policy makers in Europe and North America promoted democracy as the panacea for Africa’s political and economic problems, while non-governmental organizations also championed similar reforms. For example, “ it is only after aid donors and the World Bank had made further assistance contingent on substantive political and economic reforms that President Moi (of Kenya) agreed to a multi-party system” (Makinda 1996:566). Fayissa and El-Kaissy (1999, 46) argue that foreign aid is positively associated with economic growth which improves political and

civil liberties. However Armijo (2001:36) argues that foreign investment does not lead to democratic process. This direction according to her depends on shifts in the distribution of locally relevant political resources. Makinda (1996:572) asserts that it may be useful to link some types of foreign assistance to political and economic liberalization and also promote social justice.

Feng and Zak assert that economic development changes the behavior and attitudes of the elites. They argue that as development continues, wealth increases and educational levels of some segments of the population rise causing social heterogeneity to grow. As a result individuals begin to lose their social identification and focus on individual and family concerns. The increased heterogeneity that accompanies development strains the social contract between the autocratic ruler and his citizens. Continuing apace with development in autocracies, the social order begins to deteriorate as the citizenry 'outgrows' a repressive regime. According to Van de Walle (2000:6), by late 1980s many regimes in Africa were undergoing a legitimacy crisis brought about by their dismal economic performance and worsening economic conditions. Restive populations were increasingly willing to contest central state power through civic organizations.

This argument is founded on the tenets of the Modernization theory. Modernization theory claims that as countries save and invest at appropriate levels that help enhance their infrastructure and social institutions, liberal democratic institutions will flourish as a natural response to the functional imperatives of society, and supply the best form of government. The development of social institutions enhances the level of education of the population, improves its social and spatial mobility, and promotes the political culture that supports liberal democratic institutions.

Lipset (1959:69) argues that in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and has become stabilized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes. He suggested a complex of interrelated social and economic conditions as prerequisites for political democracy.

The relationship between economic development and democracy has occupied the attention of many scholars. Arat (1988:22) argues that Lipset initiated a new trend in which the focus was shifted from individual to system characteristics. “Lipset’s argument, through its expansion by subsequent scholars, started a discussion about the impact of socioeconomic development on political democracy” (Arat 1988:22).

“The predominant finding of quantitative comparative research on the correlates of democracy is that there is a stable positive relationship between socio-economic development and democracy. The weak version of this argument claims that increased levels of economic development are associated with democracy while the strong version suggests that economic development actually causes democracy” (Landman 1999:607) Both arguments fall within the broader modernization theory which assumes that there is a universal process of socio-economic development of which democracy is but the final stage. A common reason given for this connection is that increasing economic benefits for the masses intensify demands for the political benefits of democracy. Economic development can spread authority and democratic aspirations among a variety of people, thus fostering democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994:903, Feng and Zak 1999:162). According to Huntington; economic development is the major underlying factor generating the wave of democratic transitions.

Lipset suggested a positive linear relationship between the levels of socioeconomic development and democratic development. His conclusion was that “economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy, it is a mark of efficiency of the total system” (Lipset 1959:71). He further argued that “the stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the system’s efficiency in modernization, but also upon effectiveness and legitimacy of the political systems” (Lipset 1959:72,). Therefore as Arat observes, Lipset was arguing for socioeconomic development as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for the establishment and/or maintenance of a democratic political system (Arat 1988:22).

Education is considered as an important factor in creating the attitudes and values for a participant culture. Using survey data from Middle Eastern countries, Lerner identified urbanization, education and media growth (or communication) as the essential factors for the process of democratic development. He considered urbanization to be a factor stimulating education, which in turn accelerates media growth and eventually democratic development. Modernization theory takes an evolutionary element. It suggests that, at least in the lower stages of economic development, increases in economic development level lead to increases in the level of democracy. This contention has dominated the discussions of political democracy. According to Arat (1988:23) this contention ought to be effectively challenged. Deane Neubauer and Robert Jackman challenged the linearity of the relationship between economic development and democracy in a system. They argue that there is no significant relationship between the two properties for the highly developed countries. Arat (1988:33) in his analysis states that “democracy is not a one way ladder that countries climb as their economy and social structures develop even for the less developed countries”. Socioeconomic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition of democratic development.

Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994:907) argue that “economic development substantially improves a nation’s democratic prospects. However, the full magnitude of that effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system. As a nation moves from the core the effect diminishes. Even in the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively significant.”

Feng and Zak argue that the primary determinants affecting the timing of democratic transitions are per capita income (also Goldsmith 1997), the distribution of wealth, educational levels (also Bratton and Mattes 2001:117), and the strength of preferences for political rights and civil liberties. They argue that transitions to democracy are less likely when the level of development is low, income inequality is high, and citizens are poorly educated. In Africa, according to Feng and Zak (1999:174), the biggest obstacle to democratic transition is lack of

economic development. The poor are less likely to demand for political changes; rather they seek to attain their basic needs. Makinda (1996:568) states that “people are more interested in finding out how to cope with daily hardships than in ensuring that their governments are accountable.” This is the common criticism forwarded by critics of the structural adjustment programs required by the IMF and the World Bank. The reforms have had enormous social and economic pains on the majority of the people hence ultimately harming political stability.

There are however many criticisms of the modernization theory. Most objections focus on its deterministic and teleological quality since it assumes that all countries that achieve high levels of economic development necessarily achieve democracy. Huntington argues that without proper political institutionalization, socio-economic development could actually lead to political instability. It is also criticized as ethnocentric because it is based on patterns observed in the advanced industrial nations of Europe and North America (Armijo 2001:34). It is argued that in Latin America, economic growth did not lead to democratization, rather the reverse occurred; there was an increase in authoritarian regimes. It is also ‘a historical’ since it posits a universal trajectory for all nations thus ignoring the impact of colonization and decolonization. According to Landman, statistical models that test the theory are done on a global, cross-national level, whose framework achieves great variance due to a large number of observations. Rarely do these models focus on a particular region. He tested the claims of modernization on Latin America and states that there are not applicable in the region. Landman however argues that economic development and democracy are largely independent processes, whose statistical relationship may hold for the world but not for the Latin America context.

Armijo, like many political scientists, is skeptical about the direct relationship between economic development and democracy. She states, “there is no direct relationship between economic growth, on one hand, and the transition to or consolidation of procedural political democracy, on the other hand” (Armijo 2001:34).



Landman states that the simple causal link between economic development and democracy, which ignores the complex intervening political factors, can ultimately threaten the process of democratic consolidation if citizens expect too much of the new democracy. Once democracy is established, expectations rise for the goods of economic development to be distributed more fairly. Moreover, lack of economic performance in the new democratic period may lead to a certain nostalgia for earlier periods of economic prosperity under conditions of non-democratic rule.

### **3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Two perspectives prevail in most literature on some determinants of democratic transitions. At the macro level, the modernization theory analyzes the economic and social structures that shape the incentives of the society. At the micro level, the political agent thesis addresses the preferences and interactions among the political agents. This study incorporates both theories into a single model.

#### **3.1 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS**

##### **Socio-Economic Development**

In discussing the influence of socio economic development on democratization, modernization theory has been frequently used although it is rarely mentioned today in the political science field. The basic assumption of the modernization theory is that developing countries are on the way towards an ideal-type developmentalist model. Max Weber argued that cultural values, beliefs and interests distinguish two types of human beings, traditional and modern with the latter amenable to change and confident on the ability to bring the change around. According to Rostow (*The Stages of Economic Growth*), the development of all societies lies in five stages, which develop consecutively: (i) the traditional society, developed with limited production functions; (ii) the preconditions for the take-off, embracing societies in a transition process; (iii) the take-off, where growth becomes the normal condition in a society; (iv) the drive to maturity, when modern technology expands over the whole front of the economic, social and

political activities; and finally (v) the age of high mass-consumption, in which a large number of persons gain command over consumption, transcending basic food, shelter and clothing.

Therefore the modernization theory consists of “a gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures that culminates in a separation of political structures from other sources and makes democracy possible” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). It assumes that the process of socio-economic development is a progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society to its culmination, democratization (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). According to Feng and Kulger, modernization theory postulates that development or modernization will lead to democracy. According to Lipset, economic development leads to increased education and enlarges the middle class which in turn makes the society more receptive to democratic political tolerance. Therefore in the study, the following variables are utilized to measure socio economic development: urbanization, technology, education, life expectancy, and unemployment.

### **Political Agent Theory**

This thesis focuses on strategic interactions among political actors and its proponents argue that democratization is an outcome of actions, not just conditions. They treat democratic transitions as a multistage process characterized by the erosion and collapse of authoritarian rule, followed by a democratic transition and consolidation. This theory emphasizes the uncertainty by both the status quo and the opposition. It thus focuses on the interactions between the political elites through their behavior and the power structure in the society. Przeworski (Armijo 2001:21) argues that democracy is about institutionalized uncertainty and continuous compromise; each player’s rational calculation must lead to the conclusion that mutual compromise is superior to no-holds-barrel conflict, which holds out the possibility of total victory, but also of total defeat. Therefore democracy is entrenched by the rational choices of the political actors.

### **Democracy**

The definition of democracy has evolved over the years. Cardoso (2001:9) argues that democracy does not have a pre-established model, a recipe to be copied by all nations. Yet, he argues, there

are set of values that are fundamental and which may not be negotiated away. Lipset (71) defines democracy “as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office.” Armijo defines democracy as procedural political democracy. Here democracy is defined by wide access (all adult citizens have the vote, with no restrictions on either citizenship or voting imposed by property ownership, race, ethnicity, literacy, or other demographic or economic criteria) and specified, universalistic procedures including freedom of speech and organization, multiple political parties and candidates, secret ballots, fixed terms of office, and limited authority of elected officials, who themselves are subject to the law of the land. This definition she adds assumes that neither minimums of economic security nor economic equality are either necessary or sufficient for democratic government. Implicitly it assumes that the one person, one vote rule, combined with the legal imperative of equality before the law, is sufficient to ensure justice in the society. Arat (1988:24) developed a scale of democracy that focused on availability of political participation, competitiveness and civil liberties.

Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman constructed a *Database of Liberal Democratic Performance* that includes eight core values of liberal democratic government. The values combine the individual experience of democracy (rule of law) which includes political rights, civil rights, minority rights and property rights, and institutional efficacy of democratic government (sovereignty of the people) which include accountability, constraint, representation, and participation. They argue that “these rights and the rule of law are important guarantees of individual freedoms and protections, and so help to deliver the substance of democracy to the citizenry at large. The institutional values protect the rule of law by making government accountable to the people”. In this study, I utilize the variables in the Database of Liberal Democracy because it, in my assessment has encompasses all the core attributes of democracy.

The study therefore utilizes the procedural definition while encompassing the ability of the largest possible part of the population to influence societal decisions. Thus in this study democracy is not treated as either present or not, but we can derive a scale to measure the level of democracy in particular nations. We can also statistically test how the independent variables affect the various aspects of democracy.

### **Economic Development**

“The definition of what constitutes economic development has evolved over the years from simple statements about economic growth (percentage change in GDP and per capita levels of GDP), to the distribution of income and employment, to the full realization of the social and economic rights of citizenship” (Landman 1999:611) Despite these newer definitions, the concept continues to be thought of in terms of economic performance, and empirically, it continues to be operationalized by the real GDP per capita or energy consumption. For the study, economic development is operationalized as real GDP growth. The number reached by valuing all the productive activity within the country at a specific year's prices. When economic activity of two or more time periods is valued at the same year's prices, the resulting figure allows comparison of purchasing power over time, since the effects of inflation have been removed by maintaining constant prices. GDP or Gross Domestic Product is the value of all the goods and services produced in a country. The Nominal Gross Domestic Product measures the value of all the goods and services produced expressed in current prices. On the other hand, Real Gross Domestic Product measures the value of all the goods and services produced expressed in the prices of some base year.

### **Power Structure**

This refers to the distribution of power in a country. As discussed in the Literature Review section, in Sub-Sahara Africa, the power structure is based on the patron-client system. In the study, the variable is measured in terms of the societal structures that are used to sustain the clientelist networks. In this regard, the variables used to measure this composite variable are

wealth inequalities, strength of opposition parties, ethnicity, corruption, and public sector wages. These are some of the factors that have been identified by various scholars (as discussed in the literature review) as contributing to the growth and sustenance of the clientelist networks. In the analysis, a higher score indicates less presence of these factors and therefore a structure that allows a wider part of the population to participate in the political process.

### **Political Behavior**

This focuses on the behavior of the major political actors in a country. This behavior may be motivated by political or economic considerations and is mainly confined to the political elites in a country. In this study, political behavior is defined as the rational calculations made by all the political actors that suggest to them that the payoffs expected from playing the different games over medium run will be beneficial to their political, economic and social interests. In this regard, the variable is measured in terms of how the expected payoff from playing the democratic game benefits them over subverting democracy (Armijo 2001:21). Thus the variables used in the study to measure this composite variable: pressure, smooth, corruption, political terror, and press freedom reflect acceptance or lack of, accommodating divergent views among both internal actors (citizens) and external actors (donor communities). In the analysis, a higher score indicates that the political elites are willing to accommodate a larger section of the population in the political process.

### **Transition**

In this study transition is defined not only as the time frame within which a nation shifts from authoritarian rule and embrace democratic practices but as including the entire duration up to the time democratic practices are consolidated in a country. Therefore, the position adopted in this study is in conflict with Carother's argument that we should consider the transition paradigm as having ended. My argument is that as long as people in a country still clamor for political changes in a country that has yet to substantially embrace democratic principles as the guiding principles of societal organization, then that country is considered to be in transition. Transitional

democracy in this context should be approached from the standpoint of approaching democracy. Therefore his argument that the ‘illiberal’ democracies in Africa are not a way station to liberal democracy but an end in them is disputed in my argument. The time frame of the changes may be long and the excitement of the early 1990s faded leading to skepticism about the future of liberal democracy in Africa. The weakness in Africa highlighted by Carothers and other scholars should be considered as difficulties faced in the democratization process. But as long as there are people determined to achieve democracy in these states then we should consider them as ‘approaching democracy’. Therefore, in this context, I uphold Armijo’s (2002:22) argument that, the problem with third world regimes is that they get ‘stuck’ between the formal transition to democracy and the democratic consolidation stages.

### **3.2 THE HYPOTHESIS**

I seek to investigate whether both economic development and power sharing arrangements lead to democratic consolidation in countries in transition. If what is suggested by the modernization theorists holds, we should find a statistically significant positive relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy. Most countries should display increasing levels of democracy with increasing levels of socioeconomic development. Also if what is suggested by the Political Agent thesis holds, we should find a statistically significant positive relationship between a change in political behavior by the elites and a change in the power structure to incorporate more players in the political field and democracy. The study therefore seeks to test the general hypothesis that *there is a significant positive relationship between socio economic development, power distribution and political actors’ behavior and transitional democracy*. To test for these arguments the index scores of democracy are regressed on indicators of socioeconomic development, power distribution and political behavior.

#### **The Specific Hypothesis**

1. There is a relationship between democracy, and economic development, life expectancy, urbanization, education, unemployment and technology respectively.

2. There is a negative relationship between democracy and corruption.
3. There is a positive relationship between democracy and accommodative political behavior (measured by the composite variable for political behavior).
4. There is a positive relationship between democracy and distributive power structure (measured by the composite variable for power distribution).

#### **4. RESEARCH SETTING**

##### **4.1 SAMPLE**

This is a cross national study; therefore the population is nation states in sub-Saharan Africa. The sample size is 20 nation states. The nations included in the sample was determined by the following factors,

- Population- any nation with a population of less than 1 million was not considered. However I include Seychelles because of its relatively good economic performance. Based on this factor 7 nations were dropped: Comoros, Djibouti, Re Union, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and principle, and Cape Verde.
- Civil Wars- any nation involved or recently involved in major civil strife was not considered. Therefore 9 nations were dropped: Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, and Chad.

Of the 34 countries that met the above qualifications, I settled for a sample size of 20 nations representing over 50% of the population. To arrive at the 20 specific nations to be included in the sample, we further considered the following factors;

- Colonial Experience- To consider whether former colonial masters influence political experience in their former colonies, I divided nations into Anglophone (8), Francophone (6) and others (2).
- Regional Divisions- I seek to include nations from all regions (based on United Nations divisions). To achieve equal representation, we allocated places to each region in proportion to

their number in the continent. Therefore Eastern and Central Africa has 6, Southern 6, and Western 8.

· Electoral Democracies- I considered only those nations that are listed as electoral democracies in the UN Reports and have conducted multi-party elections in the 1990s. The nations are both stable and unstable democracies.

· Data Availability- finally we consider nations where data is available.

In the end, the following nations are included in the sample;

1. Botswana (South, Anglophone)
2. Cameroon (West, Francophone)
3. Cote de Ivoire (West, Francophone)
4. Ethiopia (East, Other)
5. Gabon (West, Francophone)
6. Gambia (West, Francophone)
7. Ghana (West, Anglophone)
8. Kenya (East, Anglophone)
9. Madagascar (East, Francophone)
10. Mali (West, Francophone)
11. Mauritius (East, Anglophone)
12. Mozambique (South, Other)
13. Namibia (South, Other)
14. Nigeria (West, Anglophone)
15. Senegal (West, Francophone)
16. Seychelles (East, Anglophone)
17. South Africa (South, Other)
18. Tanzania (East, Anglophone)
19. Zambia (South, Anglophone)



## 20. Zimbabwe(South, Anglophone)

### 4.2 VARIABLES

The data for this study will be collected from various secondary sources. Below is a table indicating the variables, measurement values and the source of data for each variable.

This is a list of variables to be considered in the study. The variables for democracy (dependent variable) are from the *Database of Liberal Democratic Performance*. This database has twenty one indicators of liberal democratic performance. The indicators are divided into eight categories comprising institutional values (accountability, representation, constraint, and participation) and legal values (political rights, civil rights, property rights, and minority rights). In this study, I will consider one indicator for each of the categories.

#### 1. ELECTION

Democratic Value: Accountability

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Pseudo democracy (state in which there are democratic structures but without a real chance for an alternance of power.)
2	Democracy (state in which there are democratic structures and there is a real chance for an alternance of power.)

Data Source: [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org)

Justification: Countries may have limited but still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping whether political party, leader, dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future (Carothers, 12).

#### 2. SEATS % of seats for the largest political party

Democratic Value: Representation (Competitiveness)

Measurement Level: Interval

Data source: [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org) (This is a website that provides an archive with all the updated information on all elections held in the world)

### 3. EXCONST

Democratic Value: Constraint

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Unlimited authority (there is no limitations on executive authority other than threats of coups or assassination)
2	Intermediate category
3	Slight to moderate limitations
4	Intermediate category
5	Substantial limitations (executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them)
6	Intermediate category
7	Executive parity or subordination (Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the chief executive in more areas of activity)

Data Source: Polity IV Dataset ([www.cidcm.umd.edu](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu)). It refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of the chief executive. The higher the score, the more democratic a country is.

### 4. PREVOTE- Presidential Vote as % of voting population.

Democratic value: Participation

Measurement Level: Interval

Data Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm [www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int))

Justification: The presidential election is the most contested election in Africa because whoever is elected affects what happens in the country. Africans are generally more interested in the presidential elections than parliamentary elections. A higher turnout represents more participation.

## 5. POLRIGHTS –Political Rights

Democratic Value: Political Rights

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	free
2	free but factors such as political corruption, violence, foreign and military influence, discrimination against minorities may be present and weaken the quality of freedom.
3 -5	conditions in 2 above and also lingering royal power, heavy military involvement in politics, unfair elections, and one party dominance though still enjoy some elements of political rights including freedom to organize quasi-political groups, free referenda and popular influence on the government.
6	ruled by military juntas, one party dictatorships, religious hierarchies or autocrats. Allow only minimal manifestation of rights.
7	political rights absent or virtually non existent.

*In the Index, a country is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. 1- 2.5 are considered free, 3- 5.5 partly free, and 5.5- 7 not free.*

Data Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) (The Freedom House Index 2003)

## 6. CRIGHTS- Civil Rights

Democratic Value: Civil Rights

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
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- 1 free including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. Have a generally established and equitable system of rule of law.
- 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties, but relatively free.
- 3- 5 Partial compliance with the level of oppression increasing at every level particularly in censorship, political terror, and prevention of association.
- 6 severely restricted rights of expression and association with few partial rights.
- 7 virtually no freedom, fear of repression characterizes these states.

*In the Index, a country is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. 1- 2.5 are considered free, 3- 5.5 partly free, and 5.5- 7 not free.*

Data Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) (The Freedom House Index 2003)

## 7. ECONFREE- Economic Freedom

Democratic Value: Index of economic freedom

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Very High economic freedom
2	High economic freedom
3	moderate economic freedom
4	low economic freedom
5	Very low economic freedom

Economic freedom is based on an assessment of trade, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign investment, banking, wages and price, property rights, regulation, and black market.

Data Source: Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal, Index of Economic Freedom 2003.  
([www.heritage.org](http://www.heritage.org))

## 8. **WOMEN** % of women in the Lower House of Legislature

Democratic Value: Minority Rights

Measurement Level: Ratio

Data Source: Inter-parliamentary Union ([www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org)). I have used the latest dates where applicable because election dates differ for all the countries.

A higher percent of women in the legislature indicates more rights for women in the nation. This is especially important in the African context since most African societies are patrimonial societies. (Makinda 1996: 570)

The independent variables are derived from the Modernization theory and Political Actors Theory. These include:

### 1. **ECONDEV**- Economic Development

Value: PPP Gross national income Per Capita 2002

Measurement Level: Ratio

*PPP is purchasing power parity; an international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as a dollar has in the United States.*

Data Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, July 2003, ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org))

### 2. **LIFEEXP**- Life Expectancy 2002

Value: Years

Measurement Level: Ratio

The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of age specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

Data Source: United Nations, Human Development Indicators 2003. ([www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org))

### 3. **URBAN**- Urbanization 2002

Value: % of population living in urban areas

Measurement Level: Ratio

Data Source: United Nations, World Report 2003. ([www.unfpa.org](http://www.unfpa.org))

4. **EDUC**- Education 2002

Value: Education Index

Measurement Level: Ordinal

*The education index measures a country's relative achievement in both adult literacy and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment. The index measures from 0 to 1.0 with 1.0 being a perfect score.*

Data Source: United Nations, Human Development Indicators 2003. ([www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org))

Justification: education can uplift the lives of the citizens giving them hope and meaning in their lives. A lack of education can cause disillusionment to the youth leading to taking up arms (Kandeh 1999: 358).

5. **UNEMPLOY**- Unemployment

Value: Unemployment levels in %.

Measurement Level: Ratio

Data Source: CIA World Fact Book 2003, [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov)

6. **TECH**- Technology

Value: Cellular phones subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2002.

Measurement Level: Ratio

Data Source: [www.itu.org](http://www.itu.org)

Justification: Cardoso (2001:7) argues that technologies strengthen democratic values, transparency and communication between the government and its citizens.

*For all the variables above, we expect that an increase in each of the variables will lead to an increase in democracy in a country except unemployment in which we expect a negative relationship.*

## **Political behavior**

### **7. SMOOTH**

Value: Accepted a smooth transition of power

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Accepted only after violence
2	accepted with reservations
3	Accepted

Data Source: U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (for various years) Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

### **8. PRESSURE:**

Value: External forces

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Extensive external pressure
2	Not extensive external pressure
3	Minimal external pressure

Data Source: U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

Justification: The pressure to democratize exerted by the western donors and their support for the ensuring democracies led some to claim that they represented the main motor behind democratization (van de Walle, Makinda).

*External pressure is ranked according to the level of threats to discontinue external funding by the major multilateral partners to the actual discontinuation of funding.*

### **9. PRESS FREEDOM**

Value: Freedom of Press Index 2003

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
0- 30	free media
31- 60	partly free media
61- 100	media not free

Data Source: Karlekar, Karin D (Ed). Freedom of Press: A Global Survey of Media Independence. ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org))

Justification: Khan argues that “in the absence of a formidable and officially recognized political opposition, the media gradually emerged to fill this democratic space. There emerged an overriding desire by the ‘radical left’ within civil society to articulate the ‘voice’ of the underprivileged majority to hold the ruling elite accountable. This culminated in the rise of radical journalism.”

## 10. PTERROR

Value: Political Terror Scale 2002.

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	No prisoners of conscience, torture and political murders rare.
2	Limited imprisonment, torture and murders rare.
3	Extensive imprisonment, political murders common and unlimited detention accepted.
4	practices in 3 extended to larger numbers
5	Terror extended to whole population

Data Source: [www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney\\_docs/pts.xls](http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls)

Justification: This variable measures the extent to which the leaders use force and terror against divergent views to maintain power in their countries.

## Structure of power

## 11. WEALTH( income inequality)

Value: Gini Index



Measurement Level: Scale

Data Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org))

*The index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequalities.*

Justification: When a country has a big gap between the rich and the poor then there is a livelihood of less democracy because of rampant inequalities (Feng and Zak 1999:164).

## 12. OPPOSITION

Value: % seats in lower house for the opposition parties.

Measurement Level: Scale

Data Source: [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

Justification: If the opposition parties hold more than a third of the parliamentary seats then they can block any constitutional amendments thus limit the power of the ruling elites to change the constitution at will.

## 13. ETHNICITY

Value: Ethnic Groups- 1 Or 2 ethnic groups form over 50% of the nation's population.

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1	Ethnic majority
2	No Ethnic majority

Data Source: World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov))

Justification: Collier (7) argues that if a society has a single ethnic group which is large enough to dominate democratic institutions then democracy itself is not sufficient to reassure minorities. He argues that an ethnic diverse society is safer than a homogenous one. In an ethnically divided society the more the ethnic groups the more the prospects for coalitions because every group needs the other.

#### 14. CORRUPT

Value

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
10	highly clean
0	highly corrupt

*Transparency International Index relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)*

Data Source: [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org) (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003)

Justification: Jimmy Kandeh (351) argues that “control of, and access to, public offices and resources determine the social location of predatory elites. But while state power is materially transformative for ruling elites, the corruption and repression that attend its exercise often preclude the construction of legitimate political institutions.” Therefore a reduction in corruption indicates a change in the structure of power since corruption feeds this power structure through the allocation of resources to the political elites.

#### 15. PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES

Value: Total Central Government Wage Bill as a % of government expenditure (2002)

Measurement Level: Interval

Data Source: World Bank, Public Sector Employment and Wage Data by Country, ([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org))

Justification: Azam (2001:16) argues that high public sector wages and salaries aim at fuelling a large flow of remittances between the urban elite group and their fellow ethnic-group members, in order to buy support from them. Thus if the wage bill has reduced, it indicates that the public sector is less utilized as a means of buying support from the people.

### COMPOSITE VARIABLES

I have developed composite variables for political behavior, power structure and democracy. The democracy variable measures the level of democracy in each country. The Political behavior variable measures the extent to which the behaviors of the political agents in particular nations accept variations of political thoughts within the society. I have created three categories, namely 'non-accommodative', 'partially accommodative', and 'accommodative' behavior.

**Behavior** – Smooth: with violence= 1; with reservations= 2; and accepted = 3.

- Pressure: Extensive=1; not extensive= 2; and minimal = 3.
- Press Freedom: not free= 1; partly free= 2; and free= 3.
- Polterror: Terror to whole=1; extensive terror=2; No to limited= 3.
- Corruption: 0-4= 1; 5-7= 2; and 8-10= 3.

I will assign every nation points based on this scale. The range of scores is 5 – 15 with low scores of 5- 8 representing little or no accommodating behavior to political pluralism, 9- 12 representing partially accommodative behavior, and 13-15 representing accommodative behavior.

**Power** -Wealth: Gini Index: 70-100= 1; 40-70= 2; and 0-30= 3.

- Opposition: Less than 15% =1; 15%-32%= 2; and with more than 33% seats= 3.
- Ethnicity: Ethnic majority= 1; and no majority= 2.
- Corruption: 0-4= 1; 5-7= 2; and 8-10= 3.
- Wages: over 30%= 1; 15%- 30% =2; and less than 15%= 3.

I will assign every nation points based on this scale. The range of scores is 5 – 14 with low scores of 5-8 representing non distributive power structure (largely patron client structure), 9-11 representing partial power distribution, and 12-14 representing well distributed power in the society.

**Democracy** The following is the criteria used to calculate a democracy score for each nation:

Variable 1. Election: Pseudo democracy =1 and democracy= 3.

2. Seats: 65% and above= 1; 50-65%=2; less than 50%= 3.

3. Exconst: 1-2 = 1; 3-5= 2; and 6 -7= 3.

4. Prevote: 60% and less = 1; 60-80%= 2; and more than 80%=3.

5. Polrights: If a country receives a 7 score (least free) = 1; 6 = 2; 3 -5= 3; 2= 4; and 1 = 5.

6. Crights: Same criterion as above.

7. Econfree: If a country scores 5 (least free) we assign 1; 4 =2; 3= 3; 2= 4; and 1= 5.

8. Women: less than 20% women members = 1; 20-30%= 2; 30-40%=3; 40-50%= 4; and over 50%= 5.

To obtain the final score, we add up the scores of each of the variables (highest possible score is  $3+3+3+3+5+5+5+5= 32$ ). Therefore the higher the overall score a country obtains, the more democratic it is deemed to be. It is important to note that the variables that represent legal values are weighted more heavily than those that represent institutional values. This is because democracy should be considered as a way of life rather than merely a system of governance. Secondly this enables us to escape the criticism by Van de Walle (2002:4) that outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order but does not fully embrace liberal democracy in its actions.

I will also rank the countries based on the final score using the divisions adopted by the Freedom House. In this case countries that score;

#### DUMMY VARIABLES

**Anglo** Anglo=1

Others= 0

**Franco** Franco= 1

Others= 0

The justification is that colonialism had an effect on the nature of governance in the ex-colonies. It emphasizes the role of historical transformation.

**Dummy variable for each region.** Gleditsch (3) argues that what happens in a region affects what happens in a country over and above what happens in the domestic politics of a country. This variable examines this relationship.

### **4.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

The analysis techniques applicable in this study are Regression Analysis and Pearson Correlation Coefficients; both conducted utilizing the SPSS software package. I will also make general observations about the state of democracy and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore the study will include both statistical analysis and descriptive analysis. Data presentation will be in the form of tables, graphs (scatter plots) and regression tables.

## **5. DATA ANALYSIS**

### **5.1 STATE OF DEMOCRACY**

As earlier stated I developed a scale to measure the level of democracy which ranges from 8 to 33, 12 representing the least liberal democratic state and 33 the most liberal democratic. The scale includes Accountability (election), Representation (percent of seats for the largest party), Constraint, and Participation (Presidential vote turnout) all representing institutional values, and Political Rights, Civil Rights, Property Rights (Economic freedom) and Minority Rights ( percent women parliamentarians ) representing legal values. In the Correlation Matrix (Table 5.1.1), we can observe that presidential vote (0.154), and seats (-.192) are the only variables that are not significantly correlated to the democratic scale. These two variables are related to elections, and these results concur with Arat's argument that participation in elections does not reflect a lot about the state democracy in a nation. Various scholars including Carothers, Van De Walle have argued that elections are a farce with nations holding elections which do not observe democratic principles like free and fair elections. Thus the use of statistics about elections that does not reflect the observance of people's real choices is not adequate. For the purpose of using Forewaker's scale, I decided to use these two measures but observe that they may not be adequate. Thus a challenge is to develop a scale that measures both participation especially in the civil society and representation.

The other measures are significantly correlated to the democracy variable with extremely high correlations. Election has a correlation of 0.726, constraint (0.802), political rights (-0.889), civil rights (-0.839), economic freedom (-0.706) and women (0.554). It is important to note that the correlations of political rights, civil rights and economic freedom are shown as negatives but they are actually positive correlations because the measure of these variables is reverse whereby a lower score in these variables represents a higher score in the democracy scale.

TABLE 5.1.1 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY

		election	seats	const	prevote	polright	hrights	econfree	women	democrat
election	Pearson Correlation	1	-.368	.663(**)	-.303	.671(**)	-.560(*)	-.393	.019	.726(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.110	.001	.194	.001	.010	.086	.936	.000
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
seats	Pearson Correlation	-.368	1	-.233	.465(*)	-.006	-.136	-.229	.072	-.192
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.110	.	.323	.039	.980	.568	.332	.762	.418
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
const	Pearson Correlation	.663(**)	-.233	1	-.086	.723(**)	.628(**)	-.658(**)	.177	.802(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.323	.	.719	.000	.003	.002	.455	.000
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
prevote	Pearson Correlation	-.303	.465(*)	-.086	1	-.220	-.284	-.233	.327	.154
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.194	.039	.719	.	.352	.224	.323	.159	.516
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
polright	Pearson Correlation	.671(**)	-.006	.723(**)	-.220	1	.916(**)	.657(**)	-.391	-.889(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.980	.000	.352	.	.000	.002	.089	.000
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
hrights	Pearson Correlation	-.560(*)	-.136	.628(**)	-.284	.916(**)	1	.735(**)	.452(*)	-.839(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.568	.003	.224	.000	.	.000	.045	.000
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
econfree	Pearson Correlation	-.393	-.229	.658(**)	-.233	.657(**)	.735(**)	1	-.442	-.706(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.086	.332	.002	.323	.002	.000	.	.051	.000
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
women	Pearson Correlation	.019	.072	.177	.327	-.391	-.452(*)	-.442	1	.554(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.936	.762	.455	.159	.089	.045	.051	.	.011
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
democrat	Pearson Correlation	.726(**)	-.192	.802(**)	.154	.889(**)	.839(**)	-.706(**)	.554(*)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.418	.000	.516	.000	.000	.000	.011	.
	N	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).


## THE DEMOCRACY SCORES

In the scale to measure democracy, we have ranked nations based on Freedom House's system of ranking ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)).

**TABLE 5.1.2; RANKING OF DEMOCRACY SCORES**

RANK	SCORE	DESCRIPTION
1	30-33	Liberal democracy where all 8 values are upheld
2	26-29	Liberal democratic but some values are not highly upheld
3	22-25	Somewhat democratic and enjoy some elements of the 8 values.
4	18-21	Like 3 above though the values are less enjoyed
5	14-17	Strong clientalist tendencies still manifest but allow manifestations of the eight values
6	11-13	Like 5 above though less manifestation of the 8 values
7	8- 10	Not democratic; the 8 values are not respected.



**CHART 5.1.1: BAR GRAPH FOR COUNTRIES**

Graphically, we see that the range of democracy scores is 12-26 with a mean of 18.5 and a median of 20. Based on the scale we can infer that the Sub-Saharan African countries are generally somewhat democratic though there are curtailments to some rights. The range of scores seems to concur with Carothers' assertion that most countries fall somewhere between outright dictatorship and liberal democracy: 'illiberal democracies'. Therefore we can infer that most nations are thus 'somewhat free' and also we can observe that the nations vary in their scale from outright dictatorship to free democracies. Republic of South Africa (26) and Botswana (23) have the highest scores while Cameroon (12) and Zimbabwe (13) have the lowest scores. These scores are generally similar to the political rights and civil rights scores assigned to African Nations in the Freedom House scale.

The results illustrate a worse picture than Larry Diamond's estimation that, "only about a third of the 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently free, fair, and competitive to meet the standard of democracy, and that only 5 of these are actual liberal democracies" (Joseph 2003:1). From the results and table 5.1.1, we can state that only the Republic of South Africa can be categorized as liberal democracy but Botswana, Mauritius and Mozambique can be categorized as somewhat liberal democracies. Of the 20 nations, 7 are in the 18-21 category that signifies trends towards liberal democracy but the eight core values are not highly upheld. Thus from the results, I concur with Richard Joseph, Larry Diamond, Carothers and Van de Walle's assertion that most Sub Saharan African nations are "illiberal democracies". In my assessment, the nations illustrate traces of democratic principles but do not uphold these institutions to allow the growth of liberal democracy.

## **5.2 SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

In this section, I consider the arguments of the modernization theory. I tested specific hypotheses with all the variables of the theory against the measure of democracy in the nations. The specific hypotheses are listed below.

### **i) Relationship between Democracy and Unemployment**

According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant negative relationship between the level of democracy and unemployment. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the level of democracy and unemployment. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 0.045 with a significance of 0.836. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no relationship between level of democracy and unemployment. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (-0.056). Though it is negative, as expected, the relationship is not significant and therefore unemployment does not appear to significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

### ii) **Relationship between Democracy and Life Expectancy**

According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between democracy and life expectancy (which reflects a generally healthy population). I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and life expectancy. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 0.410 with a significance of 0.530. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no relationship between the level of democracy and life expectancy. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (0.149). Though it is positive, as expected, the relationship is not significant and therefore life expectancy does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

### iii) **Relationship between Democracy and Urbanization**

According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between the level of democracy and urbanization. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the level of democracy and urbanization. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 0.069 with a significance of 0.796. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of democracy and urbanization. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (-0.062). The results are surprising because we expect a positive relationship but it is negative in this case. The relationship is not significant and therefore urbanization does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

### iv) **Relationship between Democracy and Education**

According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between the level of democracy and education. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the level of democracy and education. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 0.511 with a significance of 0.847. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of democracy and

education. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (0.209). Though it is positive, as expected, the relationship is not significant and therefore education does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

**v) Relationship between Democracy and Technology**

According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between democracy and technology. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and technology. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 3.285 with a significance of 0.087. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no relationship between democracy and technology. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (0.393). Though it is positive, as expected, the relationship is not significant and therefore technology does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

**vi) Relationship between Democracy and Economic Development**


According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between democracy and Economic Development. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and economic development. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 6.560 with a significance of 0.020. Since it is below 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore a significant relationship between democracy and economic development exists. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is significant (0.517). The relationship is positive as expected and is relatively strong. Therefore economic development as measured by per capita income significantly influences the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

An interesting observation from the correlation matrix is that economic development is significantly related to the other aspects of social development (urbanization (0.495), life expectancy (0.626), education (0.700) and technology (0.925). It is however not significantly related to unemployment (-0.043) which is a surprising result. Thus while the other variables of the modernization theory may not be significant influencers on the state of democracy, economic

development which is highly correlated to them is significantly related to the state of democracy. Technology is moderately correlated to the level of democracy and highly correlated to economic development. Thus, modernization theory may not explain the evolution of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa, as asserted by Arat, Landmann among other scholars, it is useful in explaining why some nations are more liberal democratic than others. From this assessment, the richer nations have more resources to allocate among the population hence less competition for the scarce resources which leads to a more democratic society. Therefore I concur with Arat's observation about Lipset's argument that economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment and/ or maintenance of a democratic political system.

**Table 5.2.1: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

		econdev	lifeexp	urban	educ	unemploy	tech	democrat
econdev	Pearson	<b>1</b>	<b>.626(**)</b>	<b>.495(*)</b>	<b>.700(**)</b>	<b>-.043</b>	<b>.925(**)</b>	<b>.517(*)</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.003	.027	.001	.874	.000	.020
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20
lifeexp	Pearson	<b>.626(**)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.361</b>	<b>.316</b>	<b>-.488</b>	<b>.686(**)</b>	<b>.149</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.	.118	.174	.055	.001	.530
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20
urban	Pearson	<b>.495(*)</b>	<b>.361</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.478(*)</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.618(**)</b>	<b>-.062</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.027	.118	.	.033	.991	.004	.796
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20
educ	Pearson	<b>.700(**)</b>	<b>.316</b>	<b>.478(*)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.288</b>	<b>.617(**)</b>	<b>.209</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.174	.033	.	.280	.004	.376
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20
unemploy	Pearson	<b>-.043</b>	<b>-.488</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.288</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.098</b>	<b>-.056</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.874	.055	.991	.280	.	.718	.836
	N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
tech	Pearson	<b>.925(**)</b>	<b>.686(**)</b>	<b>.618(**)</b>	<b>.617(**)</b>	<b>-.098</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.393</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.004	.004	.718	.	.087
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20
democrat	Pearson	<b>.517(*)</b>	<b>.149</b>	<b>-.062</b>	<b>.209</b>	<b>-.056</b>	<b>.393</b>	<b>1</b>
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.020	.530	.796	.376	.836	.087	.
	N	20	20	20	20	16	20	20

**CHART 5.2.1 SCATTERPLOT FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

### 5.3 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

#### Relationship between Political Behavior and Democracy

As earlier stated, political behavior variable is composed of five variables: pressure, smooth, corruption, political terror, and press freedom. The ranking of the calculated total is displayed on Table 5.3.1.

**TABLE 5.3.1 RANKING OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR SCORE**

Rank	Scores	Description
1	13 - 15	Accommodative Behavior
2	9 - 12	Partially Accommodative Behavior
3	5 - 8	Little/ no accommodative Behavior

In the ranking scale, accommodative behavior reflects political players who accept divergent political views in the society and are ready to compromise and reach a middle ground on the choices i.e. legislation and policies that a country pursues. Partially accommodative behavior reflects political players who allow different views in the society as long as they do not feel threatened by the political process. If there are movements or ideas that the political elites feel are subversive to their interests then they may use unorthodox means to undermine their opponents. No accommodative behavior reflects societies where the political elites do not allow for different political views in the society.


Reviewing the statistics on Table 5.3.2, we observe that the mean score is 9.35 (partially accommodative behavior). The median score is 9.0 while the mode is 11, these scores fall within the category of partially accommodative political behavior. Thus we can infer that, on average, Sub Saharan African political elites partially accommodate different political opinions and interests. This may explain the lack of well established liberal democratic societies whereby the political system accommodates different opinions, interests, and activities. As stated in the literature review, Lipset defined democracy as a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision making which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office. By not accommodating different views, political elites in the region subvert to a large extent the consolidation of democracy in the region.

Graph 5.3.3 illustrates the distribution of behavior scores for the various countries in the sample. From the graph we can observe that only Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa scored



12 points and above to be described as having political elites who have accommodative behavior. On the other end of the spectrum, 8 countries (Cameron, Ethiopia, Cote de Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) scored 8 points or less. This indicates that tolerance for divergent political opinions is not well respected by elites in many Sub Saharan African countries. 9 countries are in the partial accommodative category of which Senegal, Seychelles, Mozambique, and Mali scored relatively high scores. The rest were barely above the 8 threshold hence relatively low mean and median scores of 9.35 and 9.0 respectively.

**GRAPH 5.3.3 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR SCORES BY COUNTRY**



In reviewing the power variable (Table 5.3.4), we can observe that all variables that constitute the political behavior variable are significantly correlated (at 0.01 level) to the

composite variable. Press Freedom has the strongest correlation at -0.864, followed by Pressure 0.833, Corruption (0.779), Smooth 0.740, and finally Political Terror -0.724. Thus the variables and scores used in this study to measure the behavior of the political elites (agents) in a society are acceptable and may reflect how political agents react to different political views, opinions and interests within the society and allow these freedoms to be pursued without interference by the political agents.

**TABLE 5.3.4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR VARIABLE**  
**Correlations**

		polbeh	pressure	smooth	press	pterror	corrupt
polbeh	Pearson	1	.833(**)	.740(**)	-.864(**)	-.724(**)	.779(**)
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
pressure	N	20	20	20	20	20	18
	Pearson	.833(**)	1	.725(**)	-.655(**)	-.491(*)	.498(*)
	Correlation						
smooth	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.002	.028	.036
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18
	Pearson	.740(**)	.725(**)	1	-.600(**)	-.651(**)	.518(*)
press	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.005	.002	.028
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18
pterror	Pearson	-.864(**)	-.655(**)	-.600(**)	1	.600(**)	-.697(**)
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.002	.005	.	.005	.001
corrupt	N	20	20	20	20	20	18
	Pearson	-.724(**)	-.491(*)	-.651(**)	.600(**)	1	-.610(**)
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.028	.002	.005	.	.007
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18
	Pearson	.779(**)	.498(*)	.518(*)	-.697(**)	-.610(**)	1
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.036	.028	.001	.007	.
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the level of democracy and political behavior. The relevant  $f$  statistic is 7.597 with a significance of 0.001. Since it is well below 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there is a significant relationship between democracy and political behavior. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table

5.2.5), the relationship is significant (0.818). The relationship is very positive as expected and is also very strong. Therefore, political behavior as measured by pressure, smooth transition, political terror, free media and corruption significantly influences the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

When we observe Table 5.2.5 which is the Correlation Matrix for democracy and the variables that constitute political behavior, all variables are significantly related to democracy. Corruption has a Pearson's coefficient of 0.737 (significance of less than 0.001); Pressure 0.595 (0.006); Smooth Transition 0.627 (0.03); Free Media -0.745 (less than 0.001); and Political Terror -0.609 (less than 0.001).

In interpreting these scores we consider the points assigned to the various variables. In the cases of corruption, press freedom and political terror, the positive and negative relationships should be interpreted in reverse of what they indicate.

- In the case of corruption, the more corrupt nations were assigned lower scores while the clean nations were assigned higher scores. Therefore a positive relationship indicates that the cleaner a nation, the more democratic it is.
- Free Press: A country scored lower points if it allowed a free media while those that do not respect press freedom were assigned more points. Therefore a negative relationship indicates that the more a nation allows a free press, the more democratic it is.
- Political Terror: A country scored lower points if there is less political terror in the country while countries where terror is extended to the whole population were assigned higher scores. Therefore a negative relationship indicates that the more a nation does not allow political terror the more democratic it is.

Thus all variables that constitute political behavior are significant influencers on the state of democracy. Graph 5.3.6 shows the distribution of democracy against behavior scores for the countries in the sample. We can observe that there is a positive linear relationship between democracy and political behavior: the more a country's political elites have accommodative behavior traits, the more democratic the country is. Thus, Political Agent theory especially as constitutes political behavior may significantly address the evolution of democracy in Sub


Saharan Africa, and it is useful in explaining why some nations are more liberal democratic than others.

**TABLE 5.3.5 CORRELATIONS MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

		polbeh	pressure	smooth	press	pterror	corrupt	democrat
polbeh	Pearson	1	.833(**)	.740(**)	-.864(**)	-.724(**)	.779(**)	.818(**)
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
pressure	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	.833(**)	1	.725(**)	-.655(**)	-.491(*)	.498(*)	.595(**)
	Correlation							
smooth	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.002	.028	.036	.006
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	.740(**)	.725(**)	1	-.600(**)	-.651(**)	.518(*)	.627(**)
press	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.005	.002	.028	.003
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20
pterror	Pearson	-.864(**)	-.655(**)	-.600(**)	1	.600(**)	-.697(**)	-.745(**)
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.002	.005	.	.005	.001	.000
corrupt	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	-.724(**)	-.491(*)	-.651(**)	.600(**)	1	-.610(**)	-.609(**)
	Correlation							
democrat	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.028	.002	.005	.	.007	.004
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	.779(**)	.498(*)	.518(*)	-.697(**)	-.610(**)	1	.737(**)
	Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.036	.028	.001	.007	.	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.818(**)</b>	<b>.595(**)</b>	<b>.627(**)</b>	<b>-.745(**)</b>	<b>-.609(**)</b>	<b>.737(**)</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>							
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.006</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.</b>
	N	20	20	20	20	20	18	20

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**GRAPH 5.3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

## 5.4 POWER STRUCTURE

### II) Relationship between Democracy and Power Structure


As earlier stated, power structure variable is composed of five variables: wealth equality, ethnicity, opposition, public sector wages, and corruption. The ranking of the calculated total is displayed on Table 5.4.1.

**TABLE 5.4.1 RANKING OF POWER STRUCTURE SCORE**

Rank	Scores	Description
1	12 - 14	Well Distributed Power Structure
2	9 - 12	Partially distributed
3	5 - 8	Little/ no power distribution

Reviewing the statistics on Table 5.4.1, we observe that the mean score is 8.95 (partially distributed). The median score is 9 and mode is 8. Therefore we can observe that most of the nations have a partially distributive power structure which accommodates some political agents but omits a large number too. The scores of the various countries can be viewed on Table 5.4.2. With the exception of Ethiopia and Gambia, all other countries scored between 8 and 11. Thus nearly all the countries in the sample have a partially distributed power structure. This is in line with Van De Walle' assertion that most Sub Saharan African countries have most of the trappings of a rational legal bureaucracy but this is not done practically.

**GRAPH 5.4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRIES**



In reviewing the power variable (Table 5.4.3), we can observe that only ethnicity (0.699) and wages (-0.489) are significantly related (at 0.05 level) to power. The other variables, wealth (-0.06), opposition (0.373) and corruption (-0.33) are not significantly

correlated though opposition and corruption are moderately correlated. Thus the variables used in this study to measure the distribution of power in a society may not be conclusive and further investigation is appropriate in this case.

**TABLE 5.4.3 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR POWER VARIABLE**

		power	wealth	opposit	ethnic	corrupt	wages
power	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.060</b>	<b>.373</b>	<b>.699(**)</b>	<b>-.033</b>	<b>-.489(*)</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.818	.105	.001	.896	.029
wealth	N	20	17	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	-.060	1	.073	-.187	.627(**)	.155
	Correlation						
opposit	Sig. (2-tailed)	.818	.	.782	.472	.007	.553
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
	Pearson	.373	.073	1	-.094	-.025	.052
ethnic	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.105	.782	.	.693	.923	.827
	N	20	17	20	20	18	20
corrupt	Pearson	.699(**)	-.187	-.094	1	-.402	-.379
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.472	.693	.	.098	.099
wages	N	20	17	20	20	18	20
	Pearson	-.033	.627(**)	-.025	-.402	1	.367
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.896	.007	.923	.098	.	.135
	N	18	17	18	18	18	18
	Pearson	-.489(*)	.155	.052	-.379	.367	1
	Correlation						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.029	.553	.827	.099	.135	.
	N	20	17	20	20	18	20

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

With regard to the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and power structure, the relevant  $f$  statistic is 0.560 with a significance of 0.729. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems not to be a significant relationship between democracy and power structure. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.4.4), the relationship is not significant (0.381) though moderately strong and positive as expected.

With reference to Table 5.4.4 which is the correlation matrix for democracy and the variables that constitute power structure, only corruption is significantly related to democracy. Corruption

has a Pearson's coefficient of 0.737 (significance of less than 0.001); Wealth 0.296 (0.250); Opposition Parties 0.192 (0.418); Ethnicity -0.27 (0.910); and Public Sector wages 0.136 (0.567). Graph 5.4.5 illustrates that there may be a general linear relationship between democracy and power structure but there are many outliers. Therefore power structure as measured by wealth equality, ethnicity, public sector wages, opposition parties and corruption does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

**TABLE 5.4.4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND POWER**


**Correlations**

		democrat	power	wealth	opposit	ethnic	corrupt	wages
democrat	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.381</b>	<b>.296</b>	<b>.192</b>	<b>-.027</b>	<b>.737(**)</b>	<b>.136</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>							
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.098</b>	<b>.250</b>	<b>.418</b>	<b>.910</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.567</b>
power	<b>N</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.381</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.060</b>	<b>.373</b>	<b>.699(**)</b>	<b>-.033</b>	<b>-.489(*)</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>							
wealth	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.098</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.818</b>	<b>.105</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.896</b>	<b>.029</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.296</b>	<b>-.060</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.073</b>	<b>-.187</b>	<b>.627(**)</b>	<b>.155</b>
opposit	<b>Correlation</b>	<b>.250</b>	<b>.818</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.782</b>	<b>.472</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.553</b>
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.250</b>	<b>.818</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.782</b>	<b>.472</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.553</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>
ethnic	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.192</b>	<b>.373</b>	<b>.073</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.094</b>	<b>-.025</b>	<b>.052</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>	<b>.192</b>	<b>.373</b>	<b>.073</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.094</b>	<b>-.025</b>	<b>.052</b>
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.418</b>	<b>.105</b>	<b>.782</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.693</b>	<b>.923</b>	<b>.827</b>
corrupt	<b>N</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>-.027</b>	<b>.699(**)</b>	<b>-.187</b>	<b>-.094</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.402</b>	<b>-.379</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>	<b>-.027</b>	<b>.699(**)</b>	<b>-.187</b>	<b>-.094</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-.402</b>	<b>-.379</b>
wages	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.910</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.472</b>	<b>.693</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.098</b>	<b>.099</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.737(**)</b>	<b>-.033</b>	<b>.627(**)</b>	<b>-.025</b>	<b>-.402</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.367</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>	<b>.737(**)</b>	<b>-.033</b>	<b>.627(**)</b>	<b>-.025</b>	<b>-.402</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.367</b>
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.896</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.923</b>	<b>.098</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.135</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>
	<b>Pearson</b>	<b>.136</b>	<b>-.489(*)</b>	<b>.155</b>	<b>.052</b>	<b>-.379</b>	<b>.367</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Correlation</b>	<b>.136</b>	<b>-.489(*)</b>	<b>.155</b>	<b>.052</b>	<b>-.379</b>	<b>.367</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>Sig. (2-tailed)</b>	<b>.567</b>	<b>.029</b>	<b>.553</b>	<b>.827</b>	<b>.099</b>	<b>.135</b>	<b>.</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




**GRAPH 5.4.5 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST POWER STRUCTURE**

## 5.5 CORRUPTION

In this study, I have utilized Transparency's scale for corruption in the world. In the scale, 0 represents highly corrupted nations while 10 represents highly clean nations. Transparency International Perception index applies a definition of corruption as misuse of public power for private benefit, for example, bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, and embezzlement of public funds, as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts. The mean score is 2.97 with a median of 2.55 and mode of 2.5. We can therefore infer that most Sub Saharan African nations are highly corrupt because a median of 2.55 reflects a relatively low score in the scale. Graph 5.5.1 illustrates the scores for each of the countries in the sample. Botswana is the least corrupt while Nigeria is the most corrupt. Botswana in fact is the only nation that scores over half the score. Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa are relatively clean as

compared to the rest of the nations. Nigeria followed by Cameroon, and Kenya, are the most corrupt scoring less than 2 points. The rest of the countries scored between 2 and about 3.3. Therefore we can infer that generally African nations are highly corrupt.

**GRAPH 5.5.1 CORRUPTION SCORES BY COUNTRIES**



In testing the relationship between level of democracy and corruption, the relevant  $f$  statistic is 19.038 with a significance of less than 0.001. Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there is a relationship between democracy and corruption. When I observe the Pearson's coefficient (Table 5.5.2), the relationship is significant (less than 0.001) and very strong (0.737). Though it is positive, as earlier discussed it should be interpreted as a negative relationship because in the ranking system, the less corrupt countries received lower scores.


Graph 5.5.3 illustrates the distribution of corruption scores among the various countries. We can observe that the relationship is generally linear with Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa as the outliers. Therefore, the less corrupt a country is, the more democratic it tends to be. We can therefore state that corruption does significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.

**TABLE 5.5.2 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION**

**Correlations**

		democrat	corrupt
democrat	Pearson Correlation	1	.737**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	20	18
corrupt	Pearson Correlation	.737**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	18	18

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**GRAPH 5.5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST CORRUPTION**

## 5.6 LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

After reviewing the various variables, we have arrived at economic development, political behavior and corruption as the most influential variables influencing the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa. Table 5.6.1 is a correlation matrix for the variables. It is interesting to observe that all variables are significantly correlated to each other. As earlier noted they are all correlated to democracy. Amongst them the correlation is also significant: Economic development has a strong significant (less than 0.001) negative relationship with corruption (0.828), and positive relationship with Political behavior (0.603 with a significance of 0.05). Corruption has a strong and negative relationship with Political behavior (0.779 with a significance of less than 0.001).

**TABLE 5.6.1 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INFLENTIAL VARIABLES AND DEMOCRACY**


		democrat	polbeh	corrupt	econdev
democrat	Pearson	1	.818(**)	.737(**)	.517(*)
	Correlation				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.020
	N	20	20	18	20
polbeh	Pearson	.818(**)	1	.779(**)	.603(**)
	Correlation				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.005
	N	20	20	18	20
corrupt	Pearson	.737(**)	.779(**)	1	.828(**)
	Correlation				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000
	N	18	18	18	18
econdev	Pearson	.517(*)	.603(**)	.828(**)	1
	Correlation				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.020	.005	.000	.
	N	20	20	18	20

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Thus the aim of this section is to analyze how these variables influence the state of democracy in the region. I conducted a linear regression analysis to determine the relevance of these variables in explaining the state of democracy. To accomplish this, I performed tests to ensure that all variables met the assumptions before running the regression analysis. The distribution of the dependent variable is normal and has the same variance for all values of the independent variables. The linearity of the variables was also tested and independence of observations was met. To achieve this I took the natural log for economic development. Graph 5.6.2 illustrates a scatterplot matrix for all variables used in the regression model. We may observe that there is a linear relationship amongst the variables.

### 5.6.2 SCATTERPLOT MATRIX FOR ALL VARIABLES



### 5.6.3 REGRESSION MODEL

#### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.844(a)	.712	.651	2.2208

a Predictors: (Constant), LNecondev, polbeh, corrupt

#### ANOVA(b)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	170.953	3	56.984	11.554	.000(a)
	Residual	69.047	14	4.932		
	Total	240.000	17			

a Predictors: (Constant), LNecondev, polbeh, corrupt

b Dependent Variable: democrat

**Coefficients(a)**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	10.791	5.900		1.829	.089
	polbeh	.917	.347	.615	2.644	.019
	corrupt	1.264	1.088	.382	1.161	.265
	LNecondev	-.593	.971	-.153	-.611	.551

a. Dependent Variable: democrat

Three null hypotheses were tested, specifically, that there is no linear relationship between democracy and the group of independent variables, that the population partial regression coefficients are 0, and that the population value for multiple R square is 0.

The relevant statistic is the  $f$  statistic which tests all null hypotheses simultaneously. The multiple R is 0.844 and the multiple R square is 0.712. The  $f$  statistic is 11.554 which is large. The probability of getting this statistic or larger when the null hypotheses are true is less than 0.005.

Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null hypotheses. At least one of the population regression coefficients is not 0. Therefore the correlation coefficient (multiple R) is 0.844 and 71.2% variability in democracy is explained by the group of independent variables. The sample size is 18 and the mean natural logarithm of economic development is 7.4779. The slope for economic development is -0.593 with a standard error of 0.971. The  $t$  statistic is -0.611 with a significance level of 0.265. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the slope is 0 for corruption controlling for the other variables in the model.

The mean score for corruption is 2.97 with a slope of 1.264 and a standard error of 1.088. The  $t$  statistic is 1.161 with a significance level of 0.265. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the slope is 0 for corruption controlling for the other variables in the model.

The mean score for political behavior is 9.33 with a slope of 0.917 and a standard error of 0.347. The  $t$  statistic is 2.644 with a significance level of 0.019. Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis that the slope is 0 for political behavior controlling for the other variables in the

model. Thus political behavior has a positive relationship with democracy in the model.

Therefore the more accommodative the political behavior, the more democratic a country is.

There is a 0.917 change in democracy for every one unit change in political behavior. Political behavior (beta value of 0.615) is the most important variable contributing to the explanation of variance in the dependent variable (democracy).

## **6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

- That the state of democracy in Sub Sahara Africa is between outright dictatorship and liberal democracy. This concurs with the general assertion that African countries are more or less 'illiberal democracies. In my opinion, these nations illustrate traces of democratic principles but do not uphold these institutions to allow the growth of liberal democracy especially they score relatively **low** scores in civil rights, political rights and economic freedom. Thus as Van De Walle asserts outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinction between the public and private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order but in practice these institutions are not highly upheld.
- However the above assertion should not tempt us to underrate the gains realized over the past decade. There are obvious imperfections especially with the day-to-day politics which fall short of the democratic ideals but today, the region is better on this matter than in the late 1980s. We should also consider the fact that these young democracies are measured to strict standards of liberal democracies which even the mature Western democracies cannot meet consistently.
- I support Arat and Landmann's assertion that we cannot casually link economic development and democracy while ignoring the complex intervening political factors especially in Third World nations. They tested this hypothesis on Latin America, and their observations were supported by Acuna-Alfaro who conducted a study on democracy in Central America.
- Economic development, while having a significant relationship with democracy, does not contribute in the regression. My assertion here is that while more economically developed countries display more democratic tendencies, it doesn't alter much about the state of democracy



in the particular nations. My contention is that since the particular country has more resources to distribute, the political elite do not feel threatened because there are a lot more resources to distribute to the population to ensure that there is no prominent challenge to the status quo. In less developed countries, the political elites are forced to use more coercive measures to ensure that the population is not a threat to the status quo. However, there is a counter argument that argues that there is oppression even in richer countries, for example Nigeria, Angola and Guinea Bissau which are endowed with enormous natural resources including oil reserves. Thus economic development does not affect the underlying patron client structure, rather feeds this system such that there is less opposition to the political elites. Economic development is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for the transition and consolidation of democracy in the region.

- I agree with Van De Walle that the new democratic governments face exceptionally strong distributive pressures both from groups entering the political arena and the established interests, which may influence the political leaders not to fully embrace the principles of democracy in order to sustain power. Thus their rational calculations may suggest to them that partial acceptance to the democratic game is the best alternative. This may explain why the scores for political behavior are predominantly partial behavior (mean score 9.35). In Armijo's assertion that the problem lies between the second and third stage, that is, the internalization and normative acceptance of the new democratic procedures by all the major political players. Thus the biggest barrier to further progress may well be executive dominance (Van De Walle b 2002:74)

- Political behavior as the main predictor also serves an interesting dimension. The patron client system may not be the fundamental problem. The problem lies within the greed and self interest by the elites. As showed in the US presidential elections in 2000, political patronage practices occur even within the most advanced democracies in the world. Therefore, client networks are not really the problem. The problem and difference with the advanced democracies lies in the fact that the elites in Sub Sahara Africa use the state as a means to enrich themselves and are unrestrained, while in the West their use of the political process to protect their interests and those

of their sponsors is restrained. Thus the boundaries for these patronage practices must be tightened in the region.

- If we consider the corruption scores, we can observe that the region is relatively very corrupt. This is one area that has to be confronted. It has a high correlation with the level of democracy and political behavior. Corruption highly influences the behavior of the political elites and the attitudes of the population who expect their people in positions of power to appropriate resources to them by virtue of their status in the government. Thus any gains on consolidating democracy in the region must include measures to combat corruption.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS**

### **LIMITATIONS**

One limitation in this study is that the conclusions are based on regression analyses at a single time point (Arat 1988:23). Utilizing a time series design may be more appropriate because investigating changes over a period of time is much more effective. That could be a future research project that I may undertake. Secondly, the definition of transition to democracy utilized in this study may be considered as timeless; a country may forever be considered to be in transition. Finally, since the data collected is based on secondary sources, all weaknesses that may be highlighted about the data sources are by extension applicable in this study. We have however carefully considered the sources of the data to include only those sources that justify the research methodology utilized in their research. I also considered data sources that have been utilized by scholars who have published articles in peer-reviewed journals. The sample size is relatively small which may affect the results of the statistical analysis. Thus, the high correlations displayed and also multiple R square in the regression model is affected by the sample size. However this size was necessary because many countries did not fit our criteria and also the number of nations is not large. Thus dealing with nation states in particular regions of the world will affect the sample size. This is a disadvantage that must be accepted if such analyses are to be conducted.

## **POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

The empirically supported regularities can be used to ease the transition to democratic rule in the countries that are still generally authoritarian and help the rest to consolidate their democratic advances. The results may also reduce the probability of civil conflicts by enhancing the probability of a country maintaining democratic practices.

It may be useful to link some types of foreign assistance to political and economic liberalization. However we should not heavily rely on the Western donors because as Van de Walle (b,2002,74) argues, the donors tend to favor incumbents whom their funding buttresses, and are loath to make the kind of partisan choices promoting real change. Thus institutional changes should be encouraged through institutional learning. As citizens in the countries gain more experience from the democratic process they will learn and make more appropriate choices which may influence behavioral changes in the countries. Thus emphasis should be placed on educating the population on their political rights and choices and how they influence the policies and practices of the leaders. With every passing election, the fruits of democracy will be further developed in the countries.

As earlier asserted, because economic development is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy, efforts must continue to encourage economic development. If, as Mbaku argued, that statism and single party systems were the causes of lack of democracy and economic underdevelopment in the region, single political parties have been dismantled. While the region has gained considerably in its transition to democracy, there is still a long way to go. Since political behavior is the most significant predictor of the state of democracy in the region then my proposal is that in order to develop more accommodative behavior, statism must be abolished. A change in the predatory behavior, especially rent seeking motivations of the political elites will indicate a real transition to democracy and not remain as a way station as Carothers argues. This can be accomplished by allowing the private sector to develop in the region as the

mechanism of resource allocation. In this case, the central role of the state and especially the President in the resource allocation of resources will be greatly diminished and therefore reduce the parochial interests of the political elites in seeking favors from the incumbent.

However, this proposal will definitely meet opposition from the political elites who as observed have benefited from the patron client system sustained by statism. In order to change this, political elites have to have sufficient reasons to make rational calculations that liberal democracy is beneficial to them. This will entail compromises that may not be attractive to citizens in the region. My proposal is that these nations should privatize the state corporations while allowing the elites to buy these corporations.

This proposal has a two fold impact: By transferring resources to private hands, the state will not play a significant role in resource allocation. Therefore the state will not face intense demands from the various interest parties to distribute the scarce resources especially with the increased pressure from the inclusion of earlier displaced groups into the political process. This added pressure, scholars have argued, may undercut the democratic gains already achieved. Secondly, this will lead to the creation of business elite that is separate from the political elites unlike in the current set up. The business elites will therefore have vested interests to ensure that the state pursues sound economic policies that ensure continued business opportunities and also political policies that ensure stability in the country for long term development of their business enterprises. Thus policy failures will represent a major threat to the political survival of the leadership as opposed to the current setup as de Mesquita *et al* argue (pg 14). This will also allow the population to clearly differentiate public from private issues hence exact accountability from the political leaders, as Makinda (1996:557) asserts. Since state led development has proved not to be successful then private sector development should be embraced. As asserted in the modernization theory, economic development changes the behavior and attitudes of the elites. A private sector led economic development strategy will create new elites whose stake in the political process will be largely determined by the sustained economic development of the

country. This will best be accomplished by stability in the political process of which the consolidation of liberal democratic practices is the best alternative.

In conclusion, the behavior of the political elites in Sub Saharan politics must be tackled if the region is to consolidate the democratic gains they have achieved since the early 1990's. Fundamentally the biggest challenge remains to change the attitudes of the political players from viewing politics as a 'zero sum' game and embrace an accommodative attitude towards politics especially a 'win-win' mentality in which all members of the society benefit from the political and economic process. Private sector led economic development must also be actively pursued to reduce the poverty levels in the region. Therefore, political and economic liberalization must be jointly implemented if the region is to consolidate the democratic achievements of the past decade.

Proposed further research may focus on the behavior of the political agents, for example, a detailed study of corrupt practices in a particular nation would be appropriate. A comparative case study may be conducted especially between two countries on both ends of the democratic ranking scale, for example Republic of South Africa and Cameroon.

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## **APPENDIX**

### **ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND UNEMPLOYMENT**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.788	1	.788	.045	.836(a)
	Residual	247.650	14	17.689		
	Total	248.438	15			

a Predictors: (Constant), unemploy

b Dependent Variable: democrat

### **ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.162	1	6.162	.410	.530(a)
	Residual	270.838	18	15.047		
	Total	277.000	19			

a Predictors: (Constant), lifeexp

b Dependent Variable: democrat

### **ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND URBANIZATION**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.060	1	1.060	.069	.796(a)
	Residual	275.940	18	15.330		
	Total	277.000	19			

a Predictors: (Constant), urban

b Dependent Variable: democrat

### **ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION**

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	182.000	15	12.133	.511	.847
Within Groups	95.000	4	23.750		
Total	277.000	19			

**ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	42.748	1	42.748	3.285	.087(a)
	Residual	234.252	18	13.014		
	Total	277.000	19			

a Predictors: (Constant), tech

b Dependent Variable: democrat

**ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	73.988	1	73.988	6.560	.020(a)
	Residual	203.012	18	11.278		
	Total	277.000	19			

a Predictors: (Constant), econdev

b Dependent Variable: democrat

**STATISTICS OF POWER VARIABLE**

power

N	Valid	20
	Missing	0
Mean		8.9500
Median		9.0000
Mode		8.00(a)
Std. Deviation		1.39454
Percentiles	25	8.0000
	50	9.0000
	75	10.0000

a Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown  
democrat

**ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR**

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	226.000	7	32.286	7.597	.001
Within Groups	51.000	12	4.250		
Total	277.000	19			

**ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND POWER STRUCTURE**

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	46.167	5	9.233	.560	.729
Within Groups	230.833	14	16.488		
Total	277.000	19			

**STATISTICS OF POWER STRUCTURE VARIABLE**

N	Valid	20
	Missing	0
Mean		8.9500
Median		9.0000
Mode		8.00(a)
Std. Deviation		1.39454
Percentiles	25	8.0000
	50	9.0000
	75	10.0000

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown  
democrat

# STATISTICS AND ANOVA OF CORRUPTION VARIABLE

## Statistics

corrupt

N	Valid	18
	Missing	2
Mean		2.9722
Median		2.5500
Mode		2.50
Std. Deviation		1.13698

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	130.406	1	130.406	19.038	.000(a)
	Residual	109.594	16	6.850		
	Total	240.000	17			

a Predictors: (Constant), corrupt

b Dependent Variable: democrat

# STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX FOR REGRESSION MODEL

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
democrat	18.667	3.7573	18
polbeh	9.3333	2.52050	18
corrupt	2.9722	1.13698	18
LNecondev	7.4799	.97030	18

## Correlations

		democrat	polbeh	corrupt	LNecondev
Pearson Correlation	democrat	1.000	.826	.737	.507
	polbeh	.826	1.000	.779	.568
	corrupt	.737	.779	1.000	.814
	LNecondev	.507	.568	.814	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	democrat	.	.000	.000	.016
	polbeh	.000	.	.000	.007
	corrupt	.000	.000	.	.000
	LNecondev	.016	.007	.000	.
N	democrat	18	18	18	18
	polbeh	18	18	18	18
	corrupt	18	18	18	18
	LNecondev	18	18	18	18